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Discussions of changes in the Social Security program must necessarily consider the impact
of such changes on the well-being of the poor elderly. Under the current system, the financial needs
of this population are met by the Supplement Security Income program (SSI). SSI has done much
to improve situation of the poorest elderly but has the potential to do more. This paper examines that
potential. One of the most surprising aspect of the program is that many of those eligible for benefits are not
enrolled. Here I examine the correlates of participation for a sample of eligible individuals and use the
results to simulate the effect of changes in eligibility criteria on participation and on costs. The largest
expansion considered in the paper, providing an income guarantee for all elderly individuals that is equal to
the poverty line, increases payments directed towards the elderly by 90 percent, to just over 8 billion in 1993
dollars. Although large, this $8 billion is less than half of the expenditures for the SSI disabled population
in that year. Modifications to SSI that increase income disregards, eliminate the asset test, or base income
eligibility solely on Social Security income, would be less costly, but would also provide less relief to the
poor. Importantly, all programs, including the current system, could have substantially greater effects on
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mcgarry@ucla.eduSocial Security has done much to improve the well-being of theelderly and in particular, the
well-being of the poorest among the old. In 1960 approximately 35percent of those age 65 and over
lived in poverty; today that figure is below 11percent. Much of this decline has been attributed
to increases in Social Security. Social Security has also improved the livesof our elderly citizens
by other measures. In 1960, 40 percent of elderly widows lived with theirchildren, but by 1990
less than 20 percent did so. This shift towards independentliving has been viewed as a positive
outcome of the increased income of the elderly. Labor forceparticipation among older male workers
has also fallen to roughly in half of its 1960 rate,a phenomenon that has again been attributed, by
many researchers, to the growth in Social Security.
Despite these gains, there remains a sizable fraction of the population for whomSocial Security
and other retirement resources do not provide an adequate standardof living. For these individuals
benefits are available from the Supplemental Security IncomeProgram (551). SSI provides a guar-
anteed income for all those age 65 andover, as well as the blind and the disabled. Conditional on
sufficiently low assets, there should be no elderly individual withmonthly income below $484 (in
1997 dollars) or married couple with income below $726. Inreality, however, many of the poor are
not enrolled in SSI and subsist on incomes below these levels. Inorder to improve the well-being of
the elderly it is therefore imperative that we first understandhow SSI functions and what changes
might be made to improve the financial situation of the eligiblepopulation. As the nation considers
changes in Social Security, concurrent changes in SSI might be well-advised.Successful linkage of
the two programs and implementation ofany changes requires a clear understanding of the current
system and an investigation of the costs and consequences of suchchanges. Furthermore, analyses
of the impact of Social Security reforms on thewell-being of the poorest among the elderly strongly
depend on the interaction of the two programs.
In this paper I first describe the SSIprogram in its current form, focusing exclusively on the
benefits and regulations applicable to the elderly. Iuse data from the Asset and Health Dynamics
Study to examine the behavior of a population of elderly individualswith respect to the program
guidelines and then hypothesize what modifications to the SSIprogram might be introduced and
how these changes would alter poverty rates andprogram costs. I then discuss the relationship
between Social Security and SSI and how the characteristicsof the SSI program would alter the
distributional impact of various Social Security reforms.
11 Description of the SSI program
1.1 Program Overview'
The Social Security Act of 1935 established a mechanism whereby the federalgovernment would
assist states in providing cash assistance to thepoor; for the poor elderly this assistance came
from state-run Old Age Assistance (OAA) programs. In 1972 legislationwas passed that replaced
these state-run plans with the federal Supplemental Security IncomeProgram, administered by the
Social Security Administration (SSA) •2 In contrast to the stateprograms which typically assessed
individual need on a case by case basis, the federal SSIprogram provides a guaranteed income to
all eligible individuals. In 1997 the income guarantees were $484per month for a single individual
living in his own home, and $726 for a couple. These amounts are reducedby one-third if the
recipient(s) lives in someone else's home, and are adjusted yearly for inflation. For individuals
with no other income the income guarantee is the actual benefitthey receive from SSI. For those
with other sources of income, the SSI benefit is the difference between theincome guarantee and
their countable income. Countable income is distinct from current incomein that the SSI program
disregards some portion of a potential recipient's income. The disregardsvary by income source.
The most important of these, as measured on a monthly basis,are the first $20 of unearned income
(most likely Social Security benefits), the first $65 of earned income, and one-halfof other earned
income.3 Because of the disregards, those eligible for SSIcan have income somewhat above the
guarantee, but no participant should have income below this legislated amount.
There is also an asset test required for participation in SSI. To beeligible for benefits individuals
must have collntable assets of less than $2000 and couples must have less than $3000.With respect
to the determination of countable assets, the disregards are substantial.Most importantly, an
owner occupied home regardless of value and a car worth less than $4500are excluded.4
In addition to the federal program, states have the option ofoffering supplemental benefits.
In 1997, 26 states offered supplements to elderly individuals(or couples) living independently
'The information in this section is drawn primarily from the SocialSecurity Administration (1997, 1999).
2The 551 program also took the place of the state run assistanceprograms of Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled.
31f there is less than $20 unearned income, additional earned incomecan be disregarded. Other disregards are
irregularly or infrequently received income of less than $20 per month, homeenergy assistance payments, the value
of food stamps, tuition benefits, and disaster relief.
4Other exclusions are life insurance with a face value of less than$1500, burial plots, and household furnishings of less than $2000.
2and a total of 44 states offered at least some form of supplemental benefits,including payments
aimed specifically at the blind or disabled, or at those. with particular medical needs. With these
supplements, the benefits available to individuals can vary substantially across states. For example,
the income guarantee for a couple living in California in 1997 was $1,122.20($396.20 above the
federal level), while in New York the income guarantee for a couplewas $828.50. If states choose
to follow the same eligibility guidelines as the federalprogram with respect to such issues as the
determination of countable income and assets, the Social Security Administration willadminister
the supplemental program on behalf of the state. If a state is willing to administer itsown program it
is free to alter the eligibility requirements as it wishes, includingimposing more (or less) stringent
income and asset tests and providing supplemental benefits to onlya subset of the population
eligible for SSI (e.g. those with specific medical needs).5
Those eligible for 551 are also likely to be entitled to benefits from otherprograms. SSI recipients
are eligible for food stamps in all states except California.6 Also, SSI recipients in most statesare
categorically eligible for Medicaid and need file no other application to receive these benefits.7
Medicaid itself represents a substantial financial transfer and therefore makesparticipation in the
551 program much more valuable.
Despite these potential benefits, the majority of SSI recipients remainpoor. In 1997 the poverty
lines for elderly singles and couples were $641.5 and $809.33per month, somewhat above the federal
551 guarantees. Because of the existence of income disregards,particularly the larger disregard for
earned income, some of those receiving SSI will have their incomes increased abovethe poverty line
by the federal benefit. However, for the most part, the federal SSIprogram will have little effect on
poverty rates. In contrast, the supplemental programs in some states are sufficientlygenerous that
they do guarantee income above the poverty line. Income guarantees in 1997were above the poverty
level for singles in 3 states, and for couples in 12 states. Inaddition, when the income disregards
are taken into account, individuals in many other states may also have their total incomesraised
beyond the poverty line. I examine this issue further in section 2.4.
51n1997, 27 stateadministered their own supplemental programs, 11 states hadprograms that were administered
by the Social Security Administration, 5 reported both levels of administration andone supplemental program was
administered at the county level (7 states had no optional supplementalprogram).
6Califonua incorporates the value of food stamps into itsmonthly benefit.
TForty states used 551 program guidelines to determine Medicaid eligibility. Theremaining states used different criteria.
31.2 Participation in SSI
One of the more surprising aspects of 551 is that many of those who are entitled to benefits are
not enrolled in the program. Several earlier studies have demonstrated that only slightly more
than one-half of those who appear to be eligible for SSI are actually receiving benefits (Menefee
et al. 1981, McGarry 1996). These participation rates are lower than those found for the former
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (Fraker and Moffitt, 1988) and roughly
comparable with more recent evidence on participation in the food stamp program (Blank and
Ruggles, 1996).
Several hypotheses to explain this non-participation have been offered in the literature. (See
Warlick 1979 for a detailed discussion of the various arguments.) It has been proposed that those
who do not participate are not aware of the program or that the process of applying for benefits
is too challenging either physically or intellectually. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the
stigma attached to the receipt of welfare outweighs the value of the benefits (Moffitt, 1983). Below I
briefly investigate the correlates of non-participation for a sample of SSI-eligible individuals.9 When
considering the effectiveness of the SSI program in achieving its goal of a guaranteed minimum
income, one must keep in mind these low participation rates. Similarly, analyses of the effect of
changes in the 551 program on the distribution of income and program costs must account for both
changes in eligibility and changes in participation.
2 Microdata Analysis
2.1 AHEAD Data
I use data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Study (AHEAD) to analyze the distributional
aspects of the SSI program and its potential to affect the well-being of the elderly poor.10 AHEAD
provides a nationally representative sample of the population born in 1923 or earlier and their
spouses. The respondents were first interviewed in 1993 when the age eligible portion of the sample
was approximately 70 years old or over. The entire sample consists of 8222 individuals in 6048
5Fraker and Moffit estimated much lower food stamp participation rates than did Blank and Ruggles, 38percent
versus approximately 60 percent.
9Menefee et at (1981), Warlick (1982), Coe (1985) and McGarry (1996) address this issue in detail.
'°A detailed description of the survey is available in Soldo et at, (1997).
4households.1' The analyses presented here will use a single individualor married couple as the unit
of analysis and I will refer to each observation as a family unit.12 AHEAD isideal for this study
because it contains a large sample of individuals nearly all of whom meet theage requirements
for 551 eligibility, as well as detailed information on income and assets thatallows for accurate
determination of eligibility based on the income and asset criteria.'3 Thisproject also draws
on a supplemental restricted use data file that contains geographic identifiers for the AHEAD
respondents. Because SSI benefits can vary widely across states this information isnecessary if
potential benefits are to be properly imputed. Below I note the difference ineligibility when state
programs are ignored.
2.2 Eligibility
I determine eligibility for federal 851 benefits using thespecific rules of the program as they existed
in 1993, including both the income and asset tests (SocialSecurity AdminIstration, 1993). The
federal guarantees in that year were $422 and $633 forsingles and couples.'4 I then calculate
the amount of a state supplement to which the family unit(single individual or married couple)
would be entitled based on the state of residence and theguidelines of the 581 program particular
to that state. The calculation of countable income is basedon reports of monthly income in
AHEAD, subtracting the appropriate disregards for earned and unearned income.In addition to
the standard disregards, I exclude transfers received fromfamily members or other individuals
because it is unlikely that these transfers are received with sufficientregularity to be reported to
the government and included in countable income.
With respect to calculating asset eligibility, I amagain able to follow the program guidelines
nearly exactly. I exclude the value of the home, up to $1500 in lifeinsurance, and up to $4500 in
"Included in these numbers are 189 spouses belowage 65 who would not themselves be eligible for SSI, regardless
of income. However, because federal law requires that a portion of the incomeof an age-ineligible spouse be deemed to the SSI applicant, it is important that these individuals be kept in thesample and their incomes known.
some cases there are other individuals present in the household these could bechildren, other relatives, or
non-relatives. The SSI program does not count the income of these other individualswhen determining the benefit to which the eligible unit is entitled, but the income guarantees are reducedby one-third if the potentially eligible
unit lives in the household of another. In my calculation of benefits I tooimpose this one-third reduction. In all
other respects I ignore these other individuals; I do not count their income whenconsidering the poverty status of the individual or couple, nor do I use their presence to determine theappropriate poverty line.
13Many earlier studies of participation in welfareprograms did not have asset information and imputed asset
eligibility based on income from assets,
'4A portion of the AHEAD sample was interviewed in 1994. Becausethe income measures refer to the preceeding
month, I use 1994 551 rules for all those interviewed after January1994.The federal guarantees in 1994 were $446
and $669 (Social Security Administration, 1994).
5vehicle equity (the limit on the value of a car).'5
Table 1 compares income and asset eligibility. The first panel reports the percent of the sample
that is eligible for either federal or state SSI based on the application of the income and asset
tests alone and jointly. It is apparent from these numbers that the income limits are much more
likely to be binding than are the asset limits. Twenty-nine percent of the sample has countable
assets below the SSI limits, while only 12.8 percent has income that is sufficiently low. Combining
the two criteria, 8.75 percent of family units are eligible for benefits from federal and/or state SSI
programs.
The characteristics of the 4 percent of the sample who are income eligible but not asset eligible
merit discussion. Seventy-nine percent of these units have incomes below the poverty line (not
shown), and in that sense seem to merit assistance, yet their wealth holdings prevent them from
receiving any benefits. Thus, even if the income guarantees were raised to the poverty line and all
eligible individuals participated in SSI, a fraction of the population would remain poor, at least until
their assets were depleted. The wealth holdings of this group of income eligibles/asset ineligiblesare
relatively high: mean wealth is $168,486 ($103,756 if housing wealth is excluded). Only 9 percent
of this subsample have countable assets less than twice the limits set by 551 while 23percent have
countable assets of over $100,000. Thus the asset test does serve to limit the participation of those
who can finance a some consumption with current wealth.
The state supplemental programs play a large role in increasing eligibility relative to the federal
guidelines. The second panel of table 1 highlights the effect by reporting the proportion of the
sample eligible for 551 based on federal guarantees alone. Here the fraction income-eligible falls
from 12.8 when state supplements are included to 9.9 percent; and the fraction eligible after both
the income and asset tests falls to 7 percent. The state supplementalprograms thus serve to
increase the eligible population by 24 percent.
15With respect to the exclusion of a car J am unable to identify precisely its actual value. AHEAD obtains the value
of all vehicles (cars, boats, motorcycles, etc.) in a single question, The respondent may therefore own more thanone
car, or may own other vehicles which would be included in countable assets, although this is unlikely for those with
little in the way of other assets or income. The survey also does not ask about the value of household furnishingsso
these are presumed to be less than the $2000 limit allowed under SSI and not included as part of countable assets.
62.3 Characteristics of Participants
When examining actual participation for the families in the sample, I find the same low participation
rates observed in other studies. Participation status is unknown for 11 of the 685 eligible units. Of
the remaining 674 units, 392 report that they are receiving benefits. When appropriately weighted
these numbers imply a participation rate of 55.9 percent.'6 Surprisingly this rate is identical to
the 55 percent participation rate found in 1973 and 1974 Survey of Low-Income Aged and Disabled
(Menefee et a!., 1981) and the 56 percent participation rate in the 1984 Survey of Income and
Program Participation (McGarry, 1996).'
Table 2 presents the means of several variables used in the subsequent analyses. I examine the
characteristics of three distinct groups: those who are ineligible for SSI, those whoare eligible and
receiving benefits, and those who are eligible but not collecting these benefits.'8 The ineligible
subsample is obviously better off in virtually every dimension than either of the other twogroups,
and their mean values are reported mainly for purposes of comparison. Mean income for thisgroup,
exclusive of SSI, is $1,915 per month and their net worth is $195,142,or $118,952 when housing
wealth is excluded. The average number of years of schooling (using the level ofschooling of the
male for couples) is 11.3 and 7 percent are nonwhite.
While none of those eligible for SSI benefits is well-off, those whoare actually receiving benefits
are in substantially worse financial straits than those who are not. The participants haveaverage
monthly pre-SSI income of $288, compared to $429 for those not receiving benefits. This lower
16AHEAD oversainpled individuals in heavily black and Hispanicneighborhoods so weighting is necessary to achieve
population representative statistics.
'71t is possible that participation is under represented due tomisreporting of the receipt of SSI benefits in the
AHEAD data as has been observed with other welfare programs in different datasets, c.f. Bavier (1999). It is
difficult to assess the extent of misreporting but there are several reasons to believe it does not alterthe conclusion
that a large fraction of eligible individuals fail to enroll. First, enrollment figuresare far below those predicted by
the Social Security Administration from its data (Kennedy, 1982). Second, consistent with theresults of survey
data, outreach studies have found large numbers of eligible non-participants but have had littlesuccess in increasing
enrollment (Comptroller General, 1976). And finally, if the total benefits reportedly received in theAHEAD data
are inflated to represent the population age 65 and over, and compared to published figures on totalpayments to the
elderly, the numbers are similar (see table 6). It is also worth noting that the participation rate found here isnearly identical to that found with the SIPP (McGany, 1996), a survey that is know to haveunusually accurate reporting of
income sources, in particular SSI income (Kalton, et al., 1986). To the extent that 551 benefitsare under-reported, the participation rate is an underestimate of the true probability of taking-up theprogram and costs and enrollment
figures will also be biased downward.
'8Among the ineligible population, 1.3 percent report income from SSI. Some of these individualsare likely mis-
classified due to reporting error, but others may actually be receiving benefits to whichthey are not entitled. The
Social Security Administration has estimated that 4 percent of those receiving benefitsare actually ineligible (Social
Security Administration, 1982).
7income corresponds to a higher expected benefit for the participants than for theeligible non-
participants, $223 compared to $156. This calculated benefit agrees well with the 551 income
reported by recipients: The mean value of 551actuallyreceived is $236 and the correlation between
the calculated and reported amounts is 0.74.19Whenreported 551 benefits are added to the income
of the participants their incomes actually exceedthoseof the eligible non-participants, with an
average monthly income that is $88 greater. 551 thus makes a large difference in the economic
well-being of these individuals.
With respect to asset levels, those who are receiving benefits have substantially lowernet worth
than eligible non-participants, $11,696 versus $28,155, and a lowerprobability of home ownership.
For both groups, non-housing wealth is nearly non-existent. Mean wealth,excluding housing wealth,
is $341 for participants, while for non-participants it is actuallynegative (the medians are both
zero).20 These means stand in sharp contrast to mean (non-housing) wealthreported earlier for
those who are income but not asset eligible; the mean for those household units is$103,756.
The Social Security program is typically viewed as providing nearly universalcoverage, and in
fact, 95 percent of the ineligible sample is receiving Social Security benefits.However, many of the
participants are not; only 72 percent of this subsample reported receiving SocialSecurity in the
previous month. One possible explanation for the lack of benefits is the immigrant status of this
population. Whereas 92 percent of the ineligible sample was born in the UnitedStates, only 75
percent of the eligible participants and 79 percent of the eligible non-participantswere born here.
There is also a substantial difference across groups in theage at arrival for those who did immigrate,
increasing from 24 years old among the ineligibles to 43 years oldamong the eligible participants.
This late arrival suggests that many of those eligible for SSImay not have a sufficient earnings
history to qualify for Social Security benefits and may have low benefits if they do qualify.21
19The calculated amount is on average lower than the reported amount becauseindividuals may receive higher
than predicted state benefits due to special needs. For example, in California theguarantee for an individual needing
"nonmedical out-of-home care" is $116 more per month than someone who does not. InConnecticut, individuals
may receive additional benefits to pay for such items as meals-on-wheels programs ($73.50 per month for one meal
a day) -Iaccount for these extra payments where the data permit me to do so (such as an extrapayment to those
not having kitchen facilities in California), but in most cases I am unable to assess thesespecial needs and using the
state income guarantees for those living independently, err consistently on the side of lower benefits.
20The negative mean value is the result of one observation with(non-housing) debt of $100,000. If this observation
is eliminated the mean for this subsample is $694.
21flifferences in immigration status by group are not due to a correlation betweendifferences in levels of state
supplemental benefits and the regional distribution of immigrants. The same pattern is evident ifonly federal eligibility is used.
8There is also a substantial difference across groups in marital status; 16 percent of thepar-
ticipants are married compared to 22 percent of the non-participants. The majority of those who
are not married are widowed women. Fifty-seven percent of the participants and 51 percent of the
eligible non-participants are widows.
Participants are more likely to be nonwhite, have approximately two fewer years of schooling on
average, and are much more likely to report being in poor health, 36 versus 22 percent, than eligible
non-participants. Perhaps surprisingly, living arrangements for the two groups of eligibles are sim-
ilar although participants somewhat more likely to live with others. Bothgroups are substantially
less likely to live independently and more likely to live with children than are those ineligible for
benefits.
2.4 SM and Poverty
As discussed previously, the levels of the federal guarantees relative to the appropriatepoverty lines
indicate that the effect of SSI on the poverty rate itself is likely to be small, even if theprogram
has a large effect on the well-being of the elderly poor. One commonmeasure of the degree of
poverty is the "poverty gap." The poverty gap is defined as the total dollar amount needed to raise
all incomes to the poverty line. As shown in table 3, if SSI is excluded from income thepoverty
rate for the entire sample is 17.2 percent22 and the poverty gap, weighted to represent the total for
the relevant U.S. population, is $7.45 billion.23
The second row of the table considers the effects of the federalprogram alone. If all those who
are eligible for federal benefits are assigned their expected amount, the fraction with income below
the poverty line falls only slightly but the poverty gap declines by 34percent. Adding potential
state benefits for all eligible units (row 3) decreases the poverty rate to 15.9 percent, and thepoverty
gap falls even further for a total decline of 40 percent. Even with the relatively low level of take-up
22The poverty rates presented here are somewhat higher than publishedpoverty rates of the elderly for two reasons.
First, for those elderly living with individuals other than a spouse, the income of these other individuals is not include
in my measure of total income (nor is their presence included in the determination of the appropriatepoverty line). I do so in order to measure well-being while abstracting from the decision to co-reside. Obviouslyone of the ways
poverty among the elderly can be reduced is through an increase in the number co-residing with children or others.
It is not clear that the introduction of the depend relationship improves the well-being of the elderlyperson. The
second reason fbr the high poverty rate is that the sample is representative of thoseage 70 and over. Poverty increases
sharply with age after 65.
23jremindthe reader that the AHEAD sample is representative of the non-institutional populationage 70 and
over and their spouses. In section 3.2 I discuss one method of inflating these figures to represent the values for the
population age 65 and over.
9among eligibles, the reduction in the poverty gap is substantial. As shown in the final row, using
current recipiency patterns (i.e. eligible non-participants receive zero benefits) and actual benefits,
the poverty rate is just 1 percentage point lower than without SST, but the povertygap is nearly 30
percent smaller than the no-SST value. These figures provide a clear indication of both the ability
and potential of SSI to reach the poor elderly.24
Figure 1 illustrates graphically the change in the distribution of income for the poor. The
sample used in the figure is the population with income below the poverty line in the absence of
SST. The horizontal axis measures the ratio of income to the poverty line in 10percent intervals
(0—10, 10—20,.. .90-100) and the vertical axis measures the fraction of the sample in each interval.
The dark bars depict the distribution if SST is excluded from income, while the light bars show the
expected distribution if all eligible units were to enroll in the program. The largest change comes
in the very bottom of the distribution. In the absence of SST 11.5 percent of thispoverty sample
would have incomes equal to less than 10 percent of the poverty line. For single individuals this
interval corresponds to monthly incomes of less than $58, indicating that they havevirtually no
income other than SST; for couples the interval corresponds to income less than $7325 With 100
percent participation, the fraction with incomes this low decreases to just 1.3 percent.26 There is
also a sharp change in the fraction of the sample with incomes between 70 and 80percent of the
poverty line. Federal SSI guarantees are equal to 73 percent of the poverty line for singles and
87 percent for couples. Because the majority of those eligible for benefits aresingle, a substantial
fraction of the population has their income increased to the 70-80 percent interval(although not
to exactly 73 percent of the poverty line because of the income disregards).
2.5 Correlates of non-participation
Given the potential for improvement in their financial status, one might question the decision made
by the eligible non-participants. Certainly the benefits to which the non-participating unitsare
entitled are lower than those of the participants, ($156 versus S223 on average) butthey are still
substantial, equal to 36 percent of average income. The choice is even more puzzling when one
241t should be noted that if 551 benefits are under-reported than the effect of the currentprogram on poverty is understated.
250ne would expect that if SSI were not available, other behaviors would change. Some individualsmay save or
work more prior to retirement, some may postpone retirement and some may receive greater transfers fromfamily
and friends. Others however, would have no alternative means of support.
26A11 12 family units who remain in this lowest decile are ineligible for SSI because of the asset test.
10considers the relative stability of the income of the elderly, and the likelihood thateligibility will
remain unchanged for many years. Over a lifetime the foregone benefits couldrepresent a large
sum.
To understand better the choice of non-participation, and toassess how participation rates
would change in response to changes in benefits, I estimate a probit model for theprobability of
enrolling in SSI conditional on eligibility. The underlying theoretical model assumes thateligible
units will enroll in SSI (P =1)if the gain from the program (Gd) is greater than the associated
costs (G). Thus
P.—1 1 ifG—G >0 —
1¼ 0otherwise.
C depends in large part on the magnitude of the expected benefit (B), butmay vary with char-
acteristics of the individual such as health status. The variables used tomeasure G and C follow
directly from the explanations for non-participation offered previously in the literatureas summa-
rized in section 1.2. The coefficient estimates for the reduced formspecification are reported in
table 4.
As was noted in the table of means, participationappears to be based largely on need and this
result is borne out in the regressions. The magnitude of theexpected benefit, which is inversely
related to pre-SSI income, has a positive and significant effecton the likelihood of participating.
An increase of $100 in the benefit increases the probability ofenrolling in the SSI program by 6.8
percentage points. Home ownership also has a large effect on participation, lowering theprobability
by 12.7 percentage points. As demonstrated above, net worth consistsprimarily of the value of a
home. Its effect in the regression is smaller than that of the variableindicating ownership, but it
significantly reduces the probability of enrolling. Being married is associated witha significantly
lower probability of participation, a surprising result becauseholding the expected benefit and net
worth constant, married couples have fewer resourcesper person and ought to be more in need of
assistance.27
One of the explanations frequently offered fornon-participation in welfare programs is that
individuals do not know about the program (Daponte et al.,1999). The results here contradict
this hypothesis. If there were informational barriers one wouldexpect those with more schooling
to be more knowledgeable, as might those living in a urbanarea. Here both effects are associated
27SS1 benefits and wealth are measured for the family unit.They are not scaled to be a per person measure.
11with significant reductions in participation.28 Furthermore, a primary method forinforming people
about 551 is through their receipt of Social Security. Those receiving Social Securityare therefore
more likely to have been informed about the program, but there is no effect on participation.
The effect of poor health is large and significant.29 Those inpoor health are 12 percentage
points more likely to be enrolled. This large difference may come about through the interaction of
Medicaid and SSI. As discussed previously, 581 participants are categoricallyeligible for Medicaid
in most states, increasing the incentive to enroll in SSI for those with medicalexpenses. The link
between Medicaid and SSI may also make enrollment more likely if thosehaving received medical
treatment for a prior illness were encouraged to enroll in SSI by the healthcareprovider, ensuring
that the provider was reimbuised by the accompanying Medicaid benefits.
The results in table 4 are consistent with earlier studies. While the decisionto forego 551
benefits remains a puzzle, there does seem to be strong evidence that enrollment isrelated to
need, as measured both in terms of the magnitude of the expected benefit and other factors that
proxy financial well-being. This relationship is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a
stigma associated with the receipt of welfare benefits that increases the cost of enrolling (Moffitt,
1983). Only those with benefits larger than this fixed cost choose to enroll. It also indicates that
modifications to the SSI program that increase potential benefits or decrease thestigma associated
with recipiency will increase the probability with which eligible households enrolland therefore
increase the number of participants beyond that projected from a simple increase ineligibility.
3 Possible Changes in SSI
A restructuring of the Social Security system may induce correspondingchanges in the parameters
of the SSI program. In this section 1 explore the potential effects of variouschanges in 551 guidelines
on eligibility, costs, and poverty. I look first at the elimination of the asset test, then at the effects
of increasing the income disregards and the income guarantees, and finally ata simplification of
the determination of countable income. In all cases I consider only changes to the federalprogram
and assume that states do not alter their benefit schedules or eligibility criteria inresponse. The
results of these simulations are reported in tables 5-8.
25Schooling likely also proxies differences in lifetime income not captured by the income and asset variables.
29Age was initially controlled for in the regression but it had no effect on participation when income,assets, and health were included.
12Because actual benefits and participation are not observed with these simulated changes, the
comparisons presented here use the calculated benefits and probabilities of participation imputed
from the estimated coefficients of the probit model. I estimate the total cost of each of the alterna-
tives by weighting each eligible unit's expected benefit by its calculated probability of participating
and summing these weighted amounts.30 This cost is an underestimate of the true cost of the aged
portion of the SSI program for several reasons. Most importantly, the sample in this paper excludes
eligible individuals age 65-69 unless they are married to age eligible persons, and also excludes those
in nursing homes. (The population age 65-69 is approximately 48 percent of that age 70 and over
and approximately 4 percent of the elderly are in nursing homes.) Secondly, as noted in footnote
19, my estimate of the expected benefit is biased downward because I cannot calculate the value of
payments made for special needs. Finally, there are some in the sample whom I determine to be in-
eligible for benefits who are actually receiving payments from the 551 program. These amounts are
not included in the calculations based on predicted benefits and participation. For similar reasons
the number of eligible and participating family units is not representative of all those who would
be eligible in the U.S. population. Because of these limitations I first report changes in eligibility,
participation, and costs in percentage terms (table 5) and then adjust the baseline estimates for
these biases and present estimated costs and participation levels for the populationage 65 and over
(table 6).
3.1 The effects on eligibility and participation
The first row of table 5 reports benefits and participation under the current system. For the eligible
population the empirical model predicts a participation rate of 56.7 percent, nearly identical to the
observed (weighted) rate of 55.9 percent.31 The average calculated benefit for all 685 ellgible units
is $195 (the average of $223 and $156 in table 2).
Eliminating the asset test: In redesigning eligibility guidelines one change that might be considered
is an elimination of the asset test. It is often argued that such tests discourage savings, whereas
an important goal of retirement policy is likely to be the encouragement of individual savings as
30This figure is calculated as x Benefit) where P1 is the probability an eligible unit participates and Benefit
is the benefit to which it is entitled.
31The mean of the dependent variable in table 4 differs from 55.9 because it is not weighted by sampling probabilities.
13a means of old age support. Furthermore, the asset test represents an additional administrative
burden and given the strict income limits and low participation ratemay not actually result in
large changes in the participating population. Using the AHEAD data it is possible to simulate the
effect of this change on program participation and costs. It is a relatively straightforward exercise
to calculate the increase in eligibility—the number of families whose countable income is below
the guarantees but who have assets above the limit.32 However, one also needs to determine what
fraction of the newly eligible would choose to enroll in theprogram. I do so using the estimated
effects from table 4 and the observable characteristics of each family unit.
With the elimination of the asset test those eligible for SSIunderthe current program experience
no change in eligibility or benefits and therefore no change in participation. The total number of
eligible family units however increases by 32.5 percent. Because income and asset holdingare
positively correlated the newly eligible have higher incomes and therefore lower expected benefits
than those eligible initially, $177 compared to $195. Given the positiverelationship between benefits
are participation, and the negative relationship between net worth and enrollment, the newly eligible
also have a substantially lower probability of enrolling in SST than do thoseeligible under current
rules. The probability of participating in SSI for the newly eligible is just 24.6percent compared to
56.7 for the initial sample. Based on the weighted sum of probabilities (EP) theexpected increase
in the participating population is 14.1 percent.
Using the expected benefits and the estimated probability of participation for each newly eligible
unit to predict the additional cost associated with the expansion, I find thatpayments (exclusive
of administrative expenses) increase by 11.7 percent.33
Increasing unearned income disregard: The federal income guarantees are indexed for inflation,
and have increased every year since the program's inception. The asset limits have alsogrown
32Here I consider eliminating the asset test for the federalprogram only. I assume that states maintain their current
restrictions. The change in eligibility predicted here thus differs from that in table 1 where the asset test is eliminated
at both levels.
33These calcuiations (and those that follow) assume that the decision makingprocess does not change with the
program expansions (i.e. that the estimated effects in table 4 remain valid). If the elimination of the asset test alters
the desirability of enrollment, there will be changes in participation beyond those forecasted here. Forexample,
individuals may falsely believe that they are ineligible for SSI because they own a home. Eliminating the asset test
might well reduce the prevalence of this misconception, changing the effect of home ownership on the participation
decision. Similarly, some may view the asset test as an unpleasant requirement and refuse to apply for benefits if
they need to provide such informatiort Again in this case, elimination of the asset test would increase enrollment
beyond those who are newly eligible.
14over time. However, the income disregards have never been increased and remain at their initial
levels—the first $65 of earned income and half of the remainder, and the first $20 ofunearned
income. One change in SSI that has been mentionedamong policy makers is an increase in the
$20 disregard for unearned income. The figure that has been discussed isa disregard of $75 per
month.34
In the case of eliminating the asset test, the effects are felt onlyamong the newly eligible. Here,
however, there is both an increase in benefits among those previously eligible and an increase in
the number eligible. Overall, the average benefit for the initially eligiblesubsample increases from
$195 to $221: those who were already participating initiallysee their average benefits increase
from $223 to $249 and those who were eligible but not participatingsee an increase in their average
benefits from $156 to $183 (break-down by subgroup not shown). This increase inpotential benefits
will induce some of the eligible non-participants to enroll in SST and theaverage probability of
participating for the entire eligible population increases slightly from 56.7 to 58.0percent. The
increase in benefits and participation leads to an increase of 13percent in costs for this group
alone.
In addition to these changes, there is an increase of 14.2percent in the number of eligible
units. However, the expected benefit for thegroup of newly eligibles is small, averaging just $29
per month. Because of this low benefit, their average probability of participating is 49.1percent,
and the cost arising from the increase in eligiblity is equal tojust 1.6 percent of initial spending.
Combining the additional costs for each group, the total increase in costs for thisexpansion is 14.5
percent over the initial amount.
Raising guarantees to the poverty line: Several states offer supplements to 551 whicheffectively
raise the incomes of the participating population to slightly above thepoverty line. In considering
plans to reduce or eliminate poverty among the elderly, one obvious solution is to raise the federal
income guarantee to this level. This proposal has been discussed several times in thepast (Zedlewski
and Meyer, 1989) and continues to be mentioned by policy makers. For those wholive in states
with guarantees above the poverty lines, the increase in federal benefits results inno change in their
incomes—a greater fraction of their benefit will be paid for by the federalgovernment, and a smaller
34jthaükRobert Schoeni for bringing this discussion to my attention.
15fraction by the state, but there will be no increase in the total received. Incontrast, those in less
generous states could see a sizable increase in their monthly benefits, and some of those initially
eligible but not enrolling at current levels may now find participation to be a more appealingoption.
At the same time, increasing the federal guarantees will also makemore individuals eligible for the
program and will increase participation along that avenue.
Increasing the federal guarantees to the poverty line—$577.50 per month for a single individual
and $728.33 for a couple in 199335—with no change in stateprograms, results in a sharp increase
the average benefits for those who were initially eligible, from $195 to$288, and the probability of
participating in 881increasesto 61 percent. The cost of this change is great, equal to 52percent
of initial expenditures.
Increasing benefits also has a large effect on the number of eligible units, increasing theeligible
population by 36 percent. However, as was the case when increasing the disregard, theexpected
benefit for the newly eligible is small, equal to $71, and their predictedparticipation rate is 47.3
percent. Given the relatively low benefits to which they are entitled, the expected additional
outlay of 881 benefits for this group of newly eligible is just 10 percent of initialspending. The
total increase in costs for this expansion is therefore equal to 62percent of initial expenditures with
the vast majority of the increase accruing to those who wereinitially eligible.
This simulation assumed that the asset test remained in effect. The fifthrow of table 5 reports
the results of the same increase in income guaranteesaccompanied by an elimination of the asset
test. This combination ensures that virtually all elderly will have theopportunity to increase their
incomes above the poverty line. 36
Thosewho were intially eligible for 881 are unaffected by the additional eliminationof the asset
test and the increases in benefits and costs for thisgroup are the same as in the previous example
(row 4). However, eliminating the asset test dramatically increases the eligiblepopulation, more
than doubling its size. Following this change in eligibility, theparticipating population increases
by 72 percent, 34 percentage points above the increase with no change in the asset test.Corre-
sponding to the large increases in benefits and participation there is a sharp increase in costs. In
$592.33 and $747.25 in 1994.
361t is possible that those who live with others and who have theguarantees reduced accordingly could remain
poor.
16this expansion expected payments increase by 92 percent.37
Using Social Security income: The final alternative I investigate is basing eligibility and benefits on
Social Security income alone, eliminating income disregards and conferring eligibility on those with
Social Security income, rather than countable income, below the guarantee levels. This procedure
would likely reduce administrative effort for both the Social Security Administration (SSA) and
the applicants because Social Security benefits are readily observable by SSA and need not be
reported or verified.38 The drawback is that individuals with low Social Security benefits, but with
substantial other income, could qualify for SSI, although with the asset test in place thisgroup
would be expected to be small.
The cost of this change would obviously depend on the level of Social Security that is chosen to
be the cut-off for eligibility. In the AHEAD sample, the maximum Social Security benefits received
by singles and couples eligible for federal SSI benefits under current rules are $441 and $644.
Because many family units are likely to have some income from sources other than SocialSecurity,
a reasonable choice of income limits might be the 90th percentiles— $418 for singles and $620 for
couples.4° Using these amounts as income guarantees, with no income disregards, results ina net
increase in the eligible population of 9.6 percent, with a small number of thoseinitially eligible
for benefits becoming ineligible due to the elimination of income disregards and theslightly lower
guarantee level.4' Expected participation increases by the somewhat smaller amount of 6.2 percent.
The total cost of this method is similar to the currentprogram, with an increase in expenditures
of 5 percent.
As noted earlier, these simulations are based on the assumption that theparticipation decision
does not change when benefit formulas change. In this case in particular, theassumption may not
37These figures reflect the percentage increases in the combined payments of the federal and stateprograms, Because
the simulations assume that state programs are unchanged, in many cases the increase in the federal benefits will
simply replace state spending. The percentage increase in federal costs is therefore larger than the overall increase.
When gurarantees are raised to the poverty line and the asset test remains in place,my calculations predict an
increase in federal spending of 95 percent. If the asset test is eliminated, federal spending increases by 133percent.
35Adnijmtat expenses for the 55! program are actually larger than for the OASDIprogram (Social Security
Administration, 2000). However, much of these costs are likely due to the disabled portion of the 551program not
from the benefits going to the eligible elderly.
39Because some states (notably California) have guarantees that are significantly higher than the federallevels, the
maximum Social Security benefits among all eligibles (state and federal) are much higher at $897 and $1180.
401n this simulation guarantees for 1994 are set by increasing the 1993 amounts to account for inflation.
41Ninety-one percent of the initially eligible remain eligible under the new rules.
17be valid. One might imagine that if benefits were tied directly to low Social Security rather than
to generally low income, the program might be viewed less as a welfare program and more as a
supplement to Social Security itself, and participation rates could increase across the board.42
3.2 Costs of changes
The increases in expected payments and the increases in the number of participating family units
associated with each of these changes have thus far been expressed as percentage increases relative
to the current program. Of particular relevance to policy makers and researchers is the cost of
the SSI program for the entire elderly population. As noted above, the AHEAD sample does not
provide such an estimate. By making some assumptions, however, it is possible to inflate the
baseline amounts calculated from the AHEAD data to approximate the values for the population
age 65 and over. I make these adjustments in the first row of table 6 and then apply the estimated
percentage increases for each hypothesized change (from table 5) to estimate the effects of the
program expansions.
In the first row of table 6 I present the costs and the number of participating units for the
current program using three different measures. In the first set of columns I use the population
weighted sums of observed benefits and participants for the AHEAD sample, $2.78 billion and
1.04 million participating units.43 These figures are the totals relevant for the non-institutional
population age 70 and over and their spouses. The numbers do not include the populationage
65-69 which is approximately 48 percent as large as that age 70 and over, nor do they include the
approximately 4 percent of elderly who live in nursing homes. In column 2 I incorporate these
omitted segments of the elderly population by simply multiplying the numbers in the first set of
columns by 1.54 (1.48 x 1.04). This procedure yields a total cost of $4.28 billion in 1993 dollars
and a total enrolled population of 1.6 million family units.45 As an alternative estimate(column
3), I use published figures from the Social Security Administration (SSA) for SSI benefits to aged
42The role of stigma, and indeed non-participation itself, could be eliminated in its entirety if the level of Social
Security income were the only earnings test, the asset test were eliminated, and no application for 551 was required.
Using reported benefits and recipiency corrects for any biases in my estimates based on calculated benefits and
predicted probabilities.
44ff SST benefits are under-reported then this figure is a downward biased estimate of the true cost of theprogram.
Similarly, calculations of the increase in enrollment and costs are also likely to be incorrect.
45lnfiating the AHEAD numbers by 48 percent "over-corrects" for the omitted population becausespouses of age
eligible respondents who are 65-69 are already included in the sample. The 65+ estimates axe further biased upward
if one assumes that the younger elderly are better off than older cohorts due to differences in lifetime wealth and the
predictions of the lifecycle hypothesis, and therefore less likely to be in need of SSI or to be receiving benefits.
18individuals in 1993 (Social Security
Administration, 1999). The reported values, 84.25billion and
1.46 million, compare well with the inflatedAHEAD numbers.46
The subsequent rows in the tableprovide cost and participant projections foreach of the
changes discussed in the previous section. As isevident from the percentage increasesreported
earlier, neither the elimination of the asset testnor the increase in the income disregard result ina
substantial increase in costs or in the numberenrolled. The 12-15 percent increases incosts shown
in table 5 correspond to $500 to $600million dollars when inflated torepresent the population age
65 and over, while the increases in theparticipating population are approximately200,000 units
(rows 2 and 3 of table 6).
The dramatic 92 percent cost increaseassociated with the poverty lineguarantee and no asset
test increases costs byapproximately $4 billlon and increases the number.of enrolled families by
just over 1 million. Even with this largeexpansion, the total cost of theprogram remains below
$9 billion.47 This cost is bestinterpreted relative to othergovernment programs: In 1993 total
payments to the disabled segment of the SSIpopulation were nearly $20 billion,payments to
families in the Aid to Families withDependent Children Program (AFDC)were nearly $23 billion,
and payments to food stamp beneficiarieswere $22 billion.48
3.3 The effects onpoverty
How much do these expansions
actually benefit the elderly poor? Table 3reported the potential for
the current SSI program to reduce the
poverty rate and the poverty gap. While the reductionin the
poverty rate due to 551 was small, the reduction in the
poverty gap was large, equal to a 30 percent
decrease with current recipiencypatterns. Table 7 shows the effects of thehypothesized changes to
the 581 program on thesemeasures. Using calculated benefits andpredicted participation for the
current program, the poverty rate is 16.7percent and the poverty gap is $5.34 billion.49
45The SSA estimate does not includethose elderly who originally received benefitsas blind or disabled persons and who remain classified as such. Also,although benefits are reported as theaverage per family unit, the number of recipients is listed as the number ofindividuals receiving benefits not the numberof units. I calculate the latter by dividing total benefits (measured yearly) by
average monthly benefits received (multiplied by 12). 4tThe 4.25 billion in costsreported in column 3 of table 6 represents federalcosts of 3.1 billion and state costs of 1.15 billion. Applying the 95 and 133percentage increases in federal spending (see footnotexx) to the $3.1 billion in expenditures yields total federal costs for the twopoverty line expansions of $6.04 billion and $7.2 billion. 481t should be noted, however, that theincreases in costs described here are limitedto the direct cost of benefits from the SSI program. Because SSI receipients
are likely to be categorically eligible for both foodstamps and Medicaid, the true increase in costsmay be much larger.
49For comparison with thesimulations, this calculation uses the calculatedbenefits (rather than reported) and predicted participation probabilities. The valuesreported in table 6 therefore differ slightly from thosecalculated
19Neither eliminating the asset test nor raising the disregard have a measurable effect on the
poverty rate and the reductions in the poverty gap associated with these changes are approximately
5—6percent.
Of all the changes to 551 that have been discussed here, only the changes that raise benefits to
the poverty line have a noticeable effects on the poverty rate, and even these effects are small due
to the low participation rates. If federal guarantees are raised to the poverty line the poverty rate
(row 4) falls from 16.7 to 16.4 percent. With a concurrent elimination of the asset test, poverty
falls by only an additional 0.1 percentage points. In each of these cases, however, there is a large
decline in the poverty gap. When the asset test is left in place, the poverty gap falls by 25 percent,
and it falls by 37 percent with the additional elimination of the asset test.
As shown in the final row, there is no change in the poverty rate with eligibility based on Social
Security, but the poverty gap actually increases. This increase is because some 551 benefits in this
regime accrue to those with incomes above the poverty line and therefore have no effect on the
poverty gap, while some individuals with incomes below the poverty line lose their benefits. It is
important to note that these declines are measured relative to the current program which in and
of itself provides a 30 percent reduction relative to situation without 551. (As shown in table 3, the
poverty rate with no 551 is 17.2 percent and the poverty gap is $7.45 billion.)
3.4 Characteristics of the newly eligible
The preceding tables report the changes in participation, costs, and poverty associated with various
changes in the parameters of the SSI program. Each of these changes will benefit a somewhat
different subset of individuals. Table 8 presents the means of the regression variables for the newly
eligible units under each of these scenarios. For comparison, the means of those initially eligible
are reported in the first column.
By definition, those who become eligible when the asset test is eliminated have substantially
higher levels of assets than those who are initially eligible. In this case the mean value of wealth
(including housing wealth) for the newly eligible is $185,278, nearly ten times that of the initial
sample. This high wealth level is responsible for the low predicted probability of participating in
based on observed benefits and participation shown in the final row of table 3 ($5.3 billion). Note also that these
numbers are not inflated to account for the age restrictions on the AHEAD sample. The reader can scale these
numbers by 1.54 if such an estimate is desired.
20551 (24.6 percent) seen in table 5. The newly eligible are also twice as likely toown a home and to
be married, and have over three more years of schooling onaverage.
In contrast, when the unearned income disregard is raised (scenario2), those who become
eligible must still meet the asset test and mean assets are not changed noticeably. In fact, the
population of newly eligibles is quite similar to those initially eligible. The largest differencesare
in the probability of receiving Social Security and of reporting positiveearnings. Because nearly
all those without Social Security are likely to be eligible for 551 benefits with the initial(lower)
disregard, and because increases in the unearned income disregard act to increase the amount
of Social Security that is excluded from countable income,virtually all of the newly eligible, 99
percent, are receiving Social Security.
Raising the benefit guarantees to the poverty line will again have little effecton asset levels,
but will allow those with greater incomes to qualify for benefits.Thus, as shown in the column
for scenario 3, while the newly eligible population is againnearly certain to have Social Security
benefits, and has a much higher level of earnings, assets are only slightly above those for theinitially
eligible subsample.
Eliminating the asset test along with the increase in the benefit guaranteesagain results in a
newly eligible population with substantial net worth. The mean value of assets for thisgroup is
$100,010. The newly eligible are substantially more likely to owna home, have more schooling, and
are less likely to be nonwhite or in poor health. They are also more likely to have SocialSecurity
income and income from earnings.
Finally, if Social Security income alone is used in determining eligibility,many of those with
substantial labor earnings will be entitled to benefits. Because individualscan have unlimited
labor earnings and still qualify for benefits there is also avery large difference in the fraction with
earnings, 2 versus 15 percent, and in mean earnings (over positive values) which increase from $179
to $597 per month.
4 Relationship between SSI and SocialSecurity
As plans to reform Social Security are discussed, and their effectson the well-being of the population
analyzed, it is important to keep in mind the potential interactions with SSI. One feature of the
SSI program that has important consequences for the role of SocialSecurity in affecting the welfare
21of the elderly poor is the implicit tax on benefits. Because the benefit from 551 is equal to the
difference between the income guarantee and countable income, any increase in unearned income
(above the $20 disregard) reduces the 551 benefit dollar-for-dollar. Thus, for 551 participants, an
additional dollar of Social Security income serves only to reduce the 551 benefit by one dollar with
no change in the total income of the recipient. Social Security payroll taxes paid by those eventually
collecting SSI are therefore in some sense "wasted" because they realize no real benefits from the
Social Security program itself.
One implication of this 100 percent tax is that those who expect to receive SSI should begin
collecting Social Security at the earliest age of eligibility. There is no advantage to postponing
retirement from age 62 to age 65 (or greater) since the higher benefit associated with later retirement
does not result in an increase in income. With such a postponement, the individual simply loses the
stream of benefits from age 62 to age 65 with no offsetting increase in income after age 65. Because
of this effect, changes in the normal retirement age for Social Security that leave unchanged theage
for early retirement will have no effect on the decision by future SSI recipients of when to collect
benefits. Furthermore, changes in Social Security benefit levels, with no changes in the structure
of SSI, will have no effect on the incomes of the majority of SSI recipients.
A popular proposal for reforming Social Security is a move to a system of individual retirement
accounts. (See Feldstein and Samwick, 1998 for a discussion of such a plan, and Feldstein and
Liebman, this volume, for estimates of its distributional effects.) Such a system would replace (at
least part of) Social Security payroll taxes with contributions invested in private sector financial
instruments to be used to finance a worker's retirement. There are several avenues along which
SSI would affect the operation and the redistributional aspects of such a system, depending on the
requirements to annuitize account balances, the type of annuities available, and the provisions for
leaving bequests.
First, as in the current system, those who expect to have balances low enough to qualify for SSI,
regardless of the annuity type chosen, have little incentive to save because their total income will be
determined exclusively by the SSI guarantees. Since savings rates are likely to be mandatory, this
effect will show up as a work disincentive, similar to in the current program. Along the same lines,
if investments in individual retirement accounts are self-directed, those who expect to be eligible
for SSI have an incentive to take inordinate risks with their portfolios because they will be unlikely
22to realize any benefit from savings with moderatereturns and will be unaffected by losses.
There is also the question of the treatment ofaccount balances. If individuals were permitted
to retain the balance in an account afterage 65, in lieu of immediate mandatory annuitization,
some provision for these balances would benecessary in the 551 asset test. One would not wish
to disqualify from 551 all those withmore than $2000 in such an account, since suchsums are
small relative to the stream of SocialSecurity benefits permitted under the currentsystem. The
accotmting of these balances would be especially important forthe disabled who may qualify for
benefits from 551 long beforeage 65, but might be disqualified if balances in retirementaccounts
were included in countable assets.
A system of mandatory annuitization wouldraise different concerns, with implicationsfor the
choice of annuity types and death benefits.Brown (1999) shows that under asingle life annuity
with no bequests, there is a sizable redistributionof wealth from those with short lifeexpectancies
(the poor) to those with long life expectancies(the rich). The magnitude of this redistribution
is lessened if annuities havesurvivorship benefits. For those who will be eligible for551, the 100
percent tax on 551 benefits associated with an increase inannuity income means that differences
between joint and single life annuities will beunimportant in most cases. If both thecouple and
the surviving spouse will be eligible for551, then changes in the magnitude of theannuity payment,
arising from changes in the survivorship option, will alterthe fractions of income coming from SSI
and Social Security annuities, but will haveno effect on total income. Regardless of theannuity
policy, total income will be equal to the 551guarantee.
A similar result follows for the choice ofperiod certain annuities. Period certain annuities
guarantee payment for a certain number ofyears even if the annuitant dies before the end of that
time. If the annuitant does die before allguaranteed payments are paid, the remaining benefitsare
paid to his heirs. To finance this potentialpayout, payments during life from these period certain
annuities are reduced relative to what they wouldbe with a straight life annuity. Brownshows that
these period certain annuities reduce theredistribution of resources from short—lived tolong—lived
individuals because they effectively increase thenumber of years of benefits for those withhigh
mortality rates. Including SSI in such a calculation reinforcesthis effect. If the annuitant is eligible
for 551, the reduction in annuitypayments needed to finance the period certainoption will not
reduce his income. And, should he die before theend of the period, he will leave wealth to heirsat
23no cost to himself.
In addition to the choice of single or joint life, and straight life or period certainannuities,
individuals may be able to choose an annuity with a bequest option. This type of annuity would
have the same effect on the redistribution of resources as a period certain annuity. Ifgiven the
option, an annuitant eligible for 551whocares at least somewhat about his heirs will accept a
reduction in the current flow of payments in order to guarantee a bequest, because he willnot
experience a corresponding reduction in actual income, SSI payments makingup the difference.
As this discussion illustrates, the distributional effects of alternative SocialSecurity reforms
can depend heavily on the interactions with 551, and the details of any reform proposals need to
consider the potential spill-over effects.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
The proposed privatization of Social Security raises a host ofconcerns over the best way to imple-
ment such a change. Chief among these concerns is how to provide for thoseelderly who reach old
age with insufficient resources. When considering the needs of the elderly poor and possible meth-
ods to alleviate their poverty, it is instructive to examine the features of theexisting SSI program
and its success in improving the well-being of its target population. Thispaper has addressed these
issues.
In its current state, the SSI program has done much to improve the lot of thepoorest elderly.
While not eliminating poverty among the elderly, it has succeeded inraising the incomes of many
of the poorest by a substantial amount. Under the currentsystem, the poverty gap for the elderly
(the amount of money needed to increase the incomes of all poor individuals to thepoverty line)
is 30 percent lower than it would be in the absence of SSI. FUrthermore, for those enrolledin the
program, SSI provides 42 percent of total monthly income, on average. However, the potential for
SSI to assist the elderly poor is even greater. Only 56 percent of those whoappear to be eligible
for benefits are actually enrolled in theprogram. If the participation rate of the current program
were increased to 100 percent, the poverty gap could be reduced by an additional 11percentage
points.
The paper explores the effects of several possible changes to the current SSIprogram. In simu-
lating the changes in participation and costs, I control for the probability that eligible individuals
24may not enroll in the program. These simulations indicate that guaranteeing all elderly an income
equal to the poverty line is potentially costly, increasing the current benefit outlays to the elderly
by 62 percent with an asset test in effect, and by over 90 percent with the concurrent elimination
of the asset test. Based on 1993 figures, this change results in an additional expenditure of 2.7
to 4 billion dollars for the entire age eligible population. However, because SSIpaymentsto the
elderly are dwarfed by those to the disabled, these changes are equal to increases of just 11 to
16 percent relative to the total payments in the SSI program. Other changes that are examined
here have smaller cost increases, and correspondingly smaller improvements in the well-being of
the elderly poor. Furthermore, because participation rates typically hover around 60 percent, the
greatest costs and the greatest improvements in financial well-being will come from programs that
also encourage higher rates of participation.
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(number of family units)
Asset Test
Income Test IneligElig Total
Eligibility using federal and state criteria
Ineligible 66.7520.47 87.23
(3709)(1416) (5125)











Percentages are weighted figures.
Numbers of family units are unweighted.
29Table 2
Means of Variables used in the Analyses
Not Eligible Eligible
ParticipatingNot Participating
Mean Std Err Mean Std Err MeanStd Err
Income variables:
Pre-SSI income (monthly) 1915 41.0 288 11.1 429 19.6
Calculated 551 benefit 0.0 0.0 223 9.6 156 9.9
Reported 551 income 2.91 0.5 236 9.9 0.0 0.0
Total income md. 551 1918 41.0 517 9.5 429 19.6
Has SocialSecurity income 0.95 0.0030.72 0.023 0.83 0.022
Has laborearnings 0.11 0.0040.010 0.0050.044 0.012
Asset variables:
Net worth 195,142 5620 11,696 1285 28,155 2896
Net worth excluding housing 118,952 4741 341 706O6t 667
Own home (0/1) 0.74 0.006 0.32 0.02 0.50 0.03
Value of home (positive) 102,877 2457 35,315 3016 57,709 4226
Demographic variables: (for male in couples)
Born in the U.S. 0.92 0.004 0.75 0.02 0.79 0.02
Age at immigration (if not native born) 24.3 0.83 43.3 2.30 36.6 3.26
Age 77.44 0.0878.88 0.3578.67 0.44
Schooling 11.3 0.05 6.4 0.21 8.2 0.25
Nonwhite 0.07 0.004 0.38 0.03 0.28 0.03
Poor health (head or spouse) 0.14 0.005 0.36 0.02 0.22 0.02
Married (0/1) 0.41 0.007 0.16 0.02 0.22 0.03
Widowed (female) 0.39 0.0070.57 0.03 0.51 0.03
Living Arrangements:
Lives alone (or w/ spouse) 0.78 0.006 0.65 0.03 0.66 0.03
Live with kids 0.16 0.005 0.26 0.02 0.28 0.03
Live with others 0.07 0.004 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.02
Number of observations 5363* 392* 282*
Negative mean wealth is due to one outlier (see text).
* Numbersof observations differs for some variables due to missing values. Participationstatus is
missing for 11 eligible households and they are excluded from the table.
30Table 3









No SSI 17.2 7.45 —
All potential federal benefitspaid 17.0 4.91 34.1
All potential benefits paid 15.9 4.43 40.5
Current recipiency patterns and benefits16.2 5.30 2S.9
The poverty gap is the total amount needed to increase all incomes to the poverty
line. Figures are weighted to represent national yearly totals for the AHEAD sample.
31Table 4
Probit Estimates of the Probability of Participating in 551
conditionalon being eligible for federal benefits
Coeff Std Err Deny
Potential benefit (100s) 0.146 0.043 0.068
Net worth (10,000s) -0.068 0.022 -0.032
Own home (0/1) -0.271 0.156 -0.127
Married (0/1) -0.435 0.156 -0.203
Years of schooling (male in couple) -0.0470.013 -0.022
Nonwhite (male in couple) 0.054 0.106 0.025
Poor health (either spouse) 0.251 0.117 0.117
Receives Social Security (0/1) -0.061 0.190 -0.028
Earnings (lOOs) -0.081 0.219 -0.038
Number of children 0.051 0.018 0.024
Urban resident (0/1) -0.283 0.112 -0.132
Number of observations 674
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.582
Regression includes indicators for missing values of some variables
and a constant term.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impact of Alternative Eligibility Guidelines for 551








Current Program 16.7 5.34 —
No Asset test 16.7 5.09 4.7
Increase unearned disregard to $75 16.7 5.03 5.8
Guarantee raised to the Poverty line
asset test remains 16.4 4.02 24.7
Guarantee raised to the Poverty line
no asset test 16.3 3.37 36.9
Social Security based eligibility
guarantee equal 90 % of maximum SS






Means of Regression Variables for Newly Eligible
Under Alternative Changes in the 551 program
Scenario
Initally
Eligible (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential benefit 195 177 21 71 144 140
Net worth 19,028 185,278 16,346 24,043 100,01031,342
Own home (0/1) 0.40 0.82 0.42 0.55 0.68 0.61
Married (0/1) 0.19 0.430.13 0.11 0.220.26
Years of schooling (male in couple) 7.17 10.437.238.03 9.43 9.42
Nonwhite (male in couple) 0.33 0.140.250.27 0.160.23
Poor health (either spouse) 0.30 0.170.290.28 0.200.17
Receives Social Security (0/1) 0.80 0.900.990.99 0.960.90
Number with earnings 0.02 0.040.090.07 0.050.15
Earnings (if positive) 179 62 30 188 222 597
Number of children 3.3 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.6 3.0
Urban resident (0/1) 0.70 0.610.66 0.67 0.66 0.67
Number of observations 685 178 96 246 607 125
Scenario (1) corresponds to the elimination of the asset test.
Scenario (2) corresponds to raising the disregard for unearned income to $75.
Scenario (3) corresponds to raising guarantees to the poverty line with an asset test.
Scenario (4) corresponds to raising guarantees to the poverty line with no asset test.
Scenario (5) corresponds to using only SS income to determine eligibility.
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